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The Global War on Terror (GWOT) since September 2001 
has caused an unprecedented use of reserve forces (since 
the 1950s), in particular the Army National Guard. With 
GWOT being fought at home and abroad, the military and 
federal agencies are acting and fighting in unison to 
accomplish a variety of missions from counter-terrorism to 
nation building. 
Transformation is the process of changing the armed 
forces of the United States to becoming a more capable, 
less costly military force. Transformation is about 
providing a full spectrum of combat power to the nation in 
support of its foreign policy. Transformation is about 
leveraging technology to reduce the costs of military 
intervention.  
Transformation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) 
concerns more than merely weapons systems and technology. 
It comprises more than whether or not equipment “cascades”1 
to the Army National Guard from the Active Component (AC). 
Transformation of the Army National Guard is about creating 
unique values to the community, the state and the nation in 
crises. Transformation will result in the change of the 
types of units the ARNG put into the field.  
                     1 Cascading is the official policy of moving equipment from Active 
Component units to Reserve Component units in the equipment fielding 
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I. THE INTRODUCTION 
Military action is important to the 
nation—it is the ground of death and life, 
the path of survival and destruction, so it 
is imperative to examine it. 
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) since September 2001 
has caused an unprecedented use of reserve forces since the 
Korean War, in particular the Army National Guard. With 
GWOT being fought at home and abroad, the military and 
federal agencies are acting and fighting in unison to 
accomplish a variety of missions from counter-terrorism to 
nation building. Concurrently, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld has placed particular emphasis on the capabilities 
of National Guard and the Reserve in counter terrorism 
training.2   
Transformation is the process of changing the armed 
forces of the United States to becoming a more capable, 
less costly military force. It is about providing a full 
spectrum of combat power to the nation in support of its 
foreign policy. It is about leveraging technology to reduce 
the costs of military intervention.  
Transformation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) 
concerns more than merely weapons systems and technology. 
It comprises more than whether or not equipment “cascades”3 
to the Army National Guard from the Active Component (AC). 
This process concerns a return to the core competencies of 
                     2 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, U.S. Department of Defense, 
P.19 
3 Cascading is the official policy of moving equipment from Active 
Component units to Reserve Component units in the equipment fielding 
process for excess U.S. Army equipment. 
2 
civilian and soldier skills as applied to the community, 
state, and nation. Transformation of the ARNG is about 
creating unique values to the community, the state and the 
nation in crises. Transformation will result in the change 
of the types of units the ARNG put into the field. In the 
final analysis, such core competencies, which have been 
forged since before the earliest days of the Republic, 
demonstrate the whole value that the Army National Guard 
represents to the nation-the genius of democracy with the 
full spectrum of combat power. 
This trinity of community, state and nation 
circumscribes transformation as it relates to US ARNG in a) 
pre-strategic engagement, b) conflict phase operations and 
c) post-conflict resolution. At the same time, ARNG forces 
need to be prepared to react to the domestic issues in 
Homeland security. The role of the Army National Guard as 
both a state and federal entity causes both its successes 
and its most difficult challenges in remaining relevant to 
state and federal missions. However, transformation of the 
services requires that the ARNG surmount this challenge. 
The advent of the Department of Homeland Security will 
have a profound impact on the changing missions in which 
the ARNG will become involved. These changes address such 
issues of consequence management and disaster relief. This 
is old mission for the ARNG. With the exception of the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, homeland 
security missions use the same pool of forces that are 
needed for military-to-military contacts, conflict phase 
operations and peacekeeping.  
3 
The principle of economy of force will become a 
greater issue in the unsettled years ahead.4 ARNG forces 
will be called upon in support of civil authorities, pre-
strategic engagement, combat operations and post-conflict 
reconstruction/peacekeeping operations. The same forces 
will be required to participate in each of those 
operations.  
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum (Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau) stated, “National security starts 
with homeland security. Homeland defense is mission one 
whether it’s on American soil or in overseas combat. The 
overseas fight is “the homeland defense away game”5 LTG Blum 
spoke of the National Guard’s role in the forward defense 
of the nation in the GWOT. 
LTG Blum is correct in that the ‘away game’ matters 
for national security. In order to be relevant in the 21st 
Century, the Army National Guard must be able to join with 
the active component to create a seamless integration of 
forces. This thesis asserts that LTG Blum has only touched 
on fraction of what the Army National Guard can offer in 
terms of pre-strategic engagement, conflict integration and 
post-conflict resolution. For the true meaning of joint 
operations is not just with United States forces, coalition 
forces and others. Joint-ness, in the difficult present, 
needs to expand to include working with non-governmental 
                     4 Central to creating value is the ability to affect a “Full Spectrum 
of Military Operations”. The issue of economy of force is critical to 
transformation. Transformation seeks to decrease the amount and 
presence of military personnel and units by leveraging technology to 
replace “boots-on-the-ground”. In order to plan for the unplanned 
emergencies that may arise, the Reserve Component is used for limited 
periods to fill in the gaps. See Review of Reserve Component 
Contributions to National Defense, December 20, 2002, p.10  
5 The Army National Guard—Back to the Future by LTG H. Steven Blum, 
Land Power Essay Series, An Institute of Land Warfare Publication, 
AUSA. September 2003 
4 
organizations, the State Department and other organizations 
in the home state to produce desired strategic outcomes. To 
put the issue bluntly, the ARNG affords the U.S. an 
integration tool that offers resources that might not be 
able to be tapped by existing means as are too plainly 
limited in the regular forces as this reconstruction of 
Afghanistan and Iraq indicate. 
The larger issues appear to be part conflict and part 
systems integration in the human dimension of one to 
another. Carl von Clausewitz stated in On War, “War is the 
continuation of policy by other means.”6 Policy is derived 
by the politics before the war and after the war. When the 
war becomes the unacceptable alternative in the pre-
strategic engagement phase or the post conflict 
reconstruction phase of operations, the situation requires 
the qualities of the citizen and the soldier. Whether or 
not the idea is embraced as matter of defense policy, it is 
central to citizen soldier of the Army National Guard who 
serves two political masters, one in times of peace (state) 
and one in times of war (federal). Why? Because our 
integrated experience with civilian agencies in support of 
homeland security and disaster relief give the Army 
National Guard particular skills to work with the State 
Department, Department of Defense and USAID in the case of 
post-conflict reconstruction. The case of pre-strategic 
engagement, the Army National Guard in conjunction with the 
Air National Guard offers the State Department, the 
Department of Defense and Regional Combatant Commanders the 
ability to engage other countries without burdening the 
already taxed regular military forces. Initial military-to-
                     6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited with an introduction by Anatol 
Rapoport, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 119 
5 
military contacts and civilian-to-military contact have 
been successfully accomplished in the past with precedents 
established in the State Partnership Program in the 
National Guard.7  
  
A. CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETY  
Every organization has core competencies, things that 
the organization does best. According to Thomas F. Hall, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,  
“”Review of Reserve Component Contributions to 
National Defense” identified specialized civilian skills 
and civilian-acquired skills as a Reserve component core 
competency.”8 While important skills in medicine and 
information assurance are important, civilian occupations 
are one of the core competencies of the reserve component. 
The core competencies of the Army National Guard are 
derived out of the relationship to the community, state and 
nation. With armories in more communities across the 
country than any other military entity, the Army National 
                     7 Latvia, 1992 wanted to reform their military by modeling it after 
the National Guard. LTG Conway was able to establish the first 
partnerships in the Baltic States. This predates the US European 
Command Joint Contact or NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. The 
experience of the SPP demonstrates the ability of the National Guard to 
engage foreign countries in a manner that is both productive and 
lasting. Case in point is the IL-Poland relationship, which the IL NG 
helped Poland gain membership into NATO, participates with Poland in 
the Polish Multinational Division in Iraq and has had conferences in 
Poland on the subject of at-risk youth in 2002. For further information 
see:  Illinois National Guard – Poland, State Partnership Program 
Overview (AAR IL-SPP 03) received from LTC Keith Chambers, IL State 
Partnership Program Coordinator on 24 June 2003. Also see, John R. 
Groves, Jr. “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering 
Engagement and Progress,” p. 45 Parameters, Spring 1999 accessed on the 
web at http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/groves.htm on 9 December 2003     
8 Hall, Thomas F., Testimony to the Committee on Senate Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Personnel. March 19, 2003. accessed on the web 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/testimonies/ASDTestimony3-
19.pdf on 10 December 2003 
6 
Guard represents a way for the American people to relate to 
their service members. In 1973, at the nadir of the end of 
the Indo-China War, the Army did not have the means to 
relate back to the American people. Conscription adversely 
affected the trust of the American people during the 
Vietnam War and many joined the Army National Guard to 
avoid the war in Vietnam. Neither institution had 
credibility with the American people. The active component 
became gradually more professional and selective in the 
first fifteen years of the All Volunteer Force.9 The Army 
gained the respect of the American people through actions 
in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm (1990-91). However, in this author’s opinion, the 
Army became an increasingly closed portion of society that 
does not have roots in the community.10 The ARNG represents 
a way for the Army to reach the citizens of the United 
States through their communities. 
The Army National Guard in offering joint use of 
armories in selected locations and youth programs has 
engaged the community in force. The Army National Guard 
                     9 With the decision to eliminate the National Guard Round-out 
Brigades in favor of active component similar units and trying to 
maintain combat power, the Army tried unsuccessfully to discard the 
combat power of the Army National Guard. See Gary Hart, The Minuteman 
(The Free Press, 1998) p. 61. The increasing professional quality of 
the AVF was the results of GEN Max Thurman’s drive to increase the 
quality of the recruits by targeting high school graduates. For further 
information see Walter Y.Oi, “The Virtue of an All-Volunteer Force,” p. 
11, Regulation, Summer 2003 accessed on the web at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n2/v26n2-noted.pdf on 12 
December 2003 and Michael J. Meese, “The Army Officer Corps in the All-
Volunteer Force,” Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No.2, April 
2002, pp. 102-104. GEN Edwin H. Burba, Jr stated, “When you (the 
reserves) come to war, you (the reserves) bring America with you.” 
Attributed to Harry G. Summers, Jr. The New World Strategy (Simon and 
Schuster, 1995) p. 133 
10 Michael J. Meese, “The Army Officer Corps in the All-Volunteer 
Force,” Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No.2, April 2002, pp. 
107-108 
7 
relates back to the state and community in the consequence 
management of natural disasters such as floods, forest 
fires, earthquakes and tornadoes. Besides natural 
disasters, the Army National Guard provides support to 
domestic authorities in the form of providing domestic 
order during prison riots, prison guard strikes, riots in 
major cities and consequence management for nuclear, 
chemical and biological warfare with the 32 Civil support 
teams.11 
Every organization has core competencies-those 
attributes, which differentiate it from other organizations 
in its field. The Army National Guard has unique core 
competencies, which differentiate it from the active 
component and the United States Army Reserve. The core 
competencies of the Army National Guard are: 
1. Support to domestic authorities. The Army National 
Guard is unique in the direct relationship with the states 
via the governor. The active component and the USAR do not 
have this relationship. 
2. Positive climate for democratic civil-military 
relations. The ARNG having both a state and federal 
missions requires the organization to be subordinate to 
both the President and the state governors. 
                     11 This homeland security/military support to civilian authorities is 
very much in the spirit of US Constitution Article I, Section 8’s 
militia clauses which state, “To provide for calling forth the militia 
to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the 
service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” As well as Article 
IV, Section 4 which states, “The United States shall guarantee to every 
state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect 
each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, 
or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic violence.” 
8 
3. Community based support for units allows for second 
and third order effects on civil based operations such as 
food and clothing drives from the National Guard soldier’s 
community for Bosnia while the soldier is part of 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) Bosnia or civilian doctors from 
the community and National Guard provide training service 
to their countries (e.g. North Carolina).12 
4. Civilian skills allow creative solutions to current 
problems of great complexity.  
5. Understanding of local and state politics creates 
the ability to relate back to the American people. 
 
B. A BOND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
GEN Creighton Abrams realized in the late 1960s that 
part of the problems that rose out of Vietnam was the 
alienation of the American people.13 The Army had lost the 
trust of the American people. With the policy predictions 
of success of GEN Westmoreland, the American people did not 
see the success that he claimed for four years.14  
GEN Harold K. Johnson was the Army Chief of Staff for 
the period of the build-up of the American troops in 
Vietnam and GEN Creighton Abrams was his Vice Chief of 
Staff.15 Both men were horrified that President Johnson was 
unwilling politically to call out the Reserves and the 
National Guard for the Vietnam War. Plans for major war on 
                     12 PowerPoint presentation “State of North Carolina-Republic of 
Moldova State Partnership Program,” Stephen Mackler, DDS, MS and LTC 
Steve Sloan, given at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference 
held June 2003 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA 
13 Sorley, Lewis, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army 
of his Times. Simon and Schuster. New York, 1992 pp. 361,364  
14 ibid p. 243 
15 ibid p. 361 
9 
the scale of the Vietnam War called for the mobilization of 
reserve forces to expand the Army to meet the commitment.  
President Johnson did not believe that mobilizing 
reserves forces for Vietnam was a politically viable 
solution at the time. In his book: History of the Militia 
and the National Guard, John K. Mahon stated, 
There seem to have been three major reasons for 
President Johnson’s decision: 
1. To conceal from the American people the high 
level of military commitment that the nation was 
making in a distant land. 
2. To avoid sending belligerent vibrations to the 
North Vietnamese, the Soviets and the Chinese… 
(Korean War Escalation Scenario) 
3. Secretary McNamara gave the expression to the 
third reason: to preserve the reserve component 
as untapped power “available to meet further 
contingencies for fulfilling our treaty 
commitments.”16 
 
C. THE PERSPECTIVE OF 1965 
Additionally, the partial mobilization of reserve 
forces in 1961 for the Berlin Crisis had adverse affects on 
the decision to mobilize the Army National Guard in the 
future. The Army National Guard units were only at 60% 
combat strength and had to be filled with 39,000 members of 
the individual readiness reserve (inactive).17 The inactive 
soldiers protested being taken from their jobs sent to 
units when they had previously served. The units achieved 
combat readiness in shortest time at three months and in 
                     16 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard. p. 
242 
17 ibid p. 228 
10 
the some units did not achieve combat readiness when 
demobilized ten months later.18 Regardless, the units did 
not deploy overseas. While the emergency had been real, the 
mobilization had consequences with the families and 
employers—with political repercussions.19   
Generals Johnson and Abrams belief that reserve forces 
were the way back to the American people is true today. 
With the absence of conscription, reserve forces offer a 
way back for the Army to the American people. In the 
reserve forces, the Army National Guard that is community 
based offers the solution to meeting this need. The need of 
transparency between the people and their government is 
paramount to having good civil military relations in a 
democratic society. 
As a result, GEN Abrams designed the Abrams doctrine, 
which ensured that the active component could not go to war 
without mobilizing the Army Reserve and the Army National 
Guard. This principle of calling out the Reserve Forces of 
the Army to meet combat and non-combat commitments is still 
true today. 
Building up the concept of the Army National Guard 
involvement in pre-strategic engagement and post-conflict 
resolution, the Army National Guard offers a bond to the 
American people for decisions in foreign policy. With the 
involvement of the Army National Guard, the national will 
is called into question in the form of sacrifices that 
loved ones and employers will be forced to make. In its 
community basing, this creates a powerful force for 
                     18 ibid p. 229 
19 ibid p. 229, financially, some soldiers and airmen mobilized lost 
homes and income due to loss of income. 
11 
ensuring that the support of the American people are behind 
the decisions of their government.      
   
D. FORCE STRUCTURE/ROLES AND MISSIONS 
The force structure of the Army National Guard needs 
to be able to meet the needs of the American people over a 
large spectrum of operations. The types of units that are 
going to be in the Army National Guard need to reflect the 
following criteria: 
1. Support domestic operations such as disaster relief 
and homeland defense in its full spectrum. 
2. Support interaction and engagement with other 
democracies and fledgling democracies. 
3. Support the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in pre-
strategic engagement in the form of military-to-military 
contacts; provide timely combat arms, combat support and 
service support assets to a given regional conflict and to 
provide the nucleus of support for post-conflict 
operations.  
In terms of providing timely support to the active 
component, the Army National Guard has the ability 
successfully to provide units to the battlefield in a 
reasonably short period of time. Precursors to successful 
combat phase integration include providing non-mechanized 
units, units that focus on the collective use of individual 
skill sets such as civil affairs units, truck companies, 
personnel services detachments, maintenance companies, 
military police, etc., the propositioning of equipment 
forward to reduce throughput effects and integration of 
civilian and military facilities to reduce soldier time on 
the ground at the mobilization site.20  
                     20 For further information on this point see Edward D. Simms, Chris 
12 
For most nations transitioning to democracy after 
communist or authoritarian rule, the need for systems 
integration for ballistic effects on the battlefield are 
subordinate to establish a climate of good civil-military 
relations, reforming military education and other issues 
that exist between the military and the government.21 The 
Army National Guard can provide a positive role model and 
help establish examples of a professional reserve component 
non-commissioned officer corps, working with at-risk youth, 
positive community involvement, and how to support domestic 
authorities in natural disasters and civil unrest. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
The Army National Guard has the best potential to 
affect change and participate as a fully vested member of 
the Department of Defense. As LTG Blum stated, the overseas 
fight is homeland defense ‘away games’. The Army National 
Guard is prepared to integrate into all three phases of 
operations pre-strategic engagement, conflict phase 
                     
C. Demchak and Joseph R. Wilk “Reserve Component Logistics Units in the 
Total Force” The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Bennie 
J. Wilson III, p. 160. The authors state, “The peacetime operating 
tempo of many combat elements generates relatively low demands on the 
military logistics system, especially contrasted with those expected in 
war. These low demands allowed many logistics units to be transferred 
to the Reserve forces with no apparent effect on combat readiness.” 
While Military Police and Civil Affairs are not in the same 
classification of logistics, they do fall under the category of low 
demand units for conflict phase operations. In the aspect of post-
conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping and military operations other 
than war these units are indispensable. In regards to equipment 
disparity, see Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua, “57Transforming the 
Reserve Components ©” Military Review, September/October 2000 accessed 
at website: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/SepOct00/fautua.asp 
on 3 December 2003 
21 This argument is the central thesis of Partnership for Peace. See 
“Partnership for Peace” accessed on the web at 
http://www.rta.nato.int/pfp.htm on 10 December 2003. Also see “State 
Partnership Program Objectives” at the NGB-IA’s State Partnership 
Program website, accessed at http://www.ngb-
ia.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/overview on 10 December 2003 
13 
operations and post conflict resolution. The key to the 
future is transforming our units to meet the needs of those 
areas more effectively.  
The plan of thesis consists of the following: Chapter 
I provides a broad overview of the need for the involvement 
of the citizen soldier and the changing role of the Army 
National Guard; Chapter II examines the role of Army 
National Guard in terms of military diplomacy in the pre-
strategic engagement of other countries; Chapter III 
examines integration of the Army National Guard in combat 
operations; Chapter IV examines post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacekeeping operations and the Army 
National Guard; and Chapter V presents conclusions and 
recommendations for the future. 
This thesis examines the changing role of the Army 
National Guard in terms before (Chapter II), during 
(Chapter III) and after (Chapter IV) a war. Since as 
nation, we are fighting the GWOT. The question is what did 
we do before 9/11 in terms of engaging foreign countries 
and what benefits have been gained from this engagement. 
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II. PRE-STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT: FINDING FRIENDS 
BEFORE YOU NEED THEM 
The best way to 
destroy your enemy is to 




This chapter examines the role of the Army National 
Guard in military diplomacy in support of the foreign 
policy of the Unites States. As a state run organization 
with federal funding, the Army National Guard does not 
appear to have a right to engage in this effort to forward 
engage other countries and their militaries. Quite the 
opposite is true. In the 1989 Supreme Court decision, 
PERPICH v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, the court decided that 
the states do not have the right to prevent their soldiers 
from engaging in training overseas as part of the reserve 
of the army. As a result, the Army National Guard, which 
began the process of engaging in military-to-military 
contacts in Central America with the Operation BLAZING 
TRAILS22, has continued to engage foreign militaries in 
                     22 Clyde A. Vaughn and Paul J. Woodrow, “A haven for reserve 
component training,” Army. Arlington: March 1997. Vol.47, Issue 3: pp. 
42-47. The evolution of involvement in Central America started with the 
Minuteman I in 1984 in Panama. This successful exercise laid the 
foundation for the exercise called “Fuertes Caminos” (Blazing Trails) 
and today is called “New Horizons.” It is from these successful Annual 
Training exercises that Army and Air National Guard units begin forays 
into the areas of humanitarian, foreign engagement and nation building 
as America’s reserve component. The experience of “Blazing Trails” 
would become instrumental in the development of future Partnership for 
Peace exercises such as Exercise PEACESHIELD (1997-2002) in the Ukraine 
which has had long term impacts in terms of building security and trust 
amongst both NATO and non-NATO countries in Eastern Europe. In 
addition, the CA ARNG is proposing an engineering project for the 
historic Silk Road in Afghanistan that will involve the Ukraine and 
other SPP countries similar to the road engineering projects in 
“Blazing Trails,” accessed on the web at 
http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/documents/1 on 10 December 2003.  
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joint exercises and contacts. The Army National Guard’s 
greatest success has been the State Partnership Program 
(SPP) and the successful integration of Partner countries 
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 23  
Pre-strategic engagement is forward defense, through 
security cooperation in countries that are developing 
democratic institutions, using military diplomacy as an 
enabler for the foreign policy of the United States.  It 
facilitates forward basing and formation of coalitions of 
military forces for combat and peacekeeping. In its 
broadest context, pre-strategic engagement has wide 
reaching implications such as NATO enlargement (e.g. 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) and bilateral 
relationships (e.g. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). 
First, security cooperation is an entry point for the 
military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contact. Second, the 
State Partnership Program contributes the unique ability to 
establish mil-to-mil, civilian-to-military (civ-to-mil) and 
civilian-to-civilian (civ-to-civ) contacts using both 
military and non-military means that are at the heart of 
the state control of the Army National Guard.  
These enablers to military diplomacy vested in the SPP 
are crucial to strengthening relations and developing and 
mentoring civil-military relations in newly democratic 
                     23 The State Partnership Program was successful in working with the 
U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic in order to help those countries make a successful entry into 
NATO (ODC is the military component to the diplomatic mission in a 
foreign country). This is by no means stating that the National Guard 
Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) were responsible for the successful 
entry into NATO. However, SPP in conjunction with the ODC and the State 
Department can make a powerful impact in establishing and maintain 
successful relations in foreign countries that seek to involve and 
engaged with NATO and in non-NATO cases the United States in the form 
of a bilateral relationship.  
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countries24. As is demonstrated in the cases of Poland, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania,25 the engagement of those 
countries using military diplomacy and the SPP was part of 
the critical effort in gaining peacekeeping forces for 
post-conflict operations in Iraq by engaging forward in the 
pre-strategic fashion.  
While “the mission defines the coalition,” may have a 
certain application in modern war, the nature of gaining 
that coalition is problematic if pre-strategic engagement 
is not met. For instance, if “the mission defines the 
coalition”26 who will coalesce with you if old allies (e.g. 
France and Germany in the case of Iraq) will not go along 
with your plan? The answer is the newly formed democratic 
states. Because of their desire for recognition from the 
                     24 By establishing military diplomacy with developing democratic 
countries, the National Guard State Partnership Program offers a unique 
solution to the Regional Combatant Commander. By using reserve 
component forces for military-to-military contacts and engagement, the 
overall costs are reduced in the following ways: 1.) Less expensive 
than using active component forces that would be on temporary duty for 
engagements rather than a National Guard annual training period, 2.) 
Active forces can be programmed against other contingencies rather than 
engagement or the lack of engagement if the active forces were needed 
elsewhere, and 3.) National Guard Force are less threatening to 
developing countries that can not compete with precision guided 
munitions and are more likely to want to develop as in the case of 
Latvia (1992) a military similar to the National Guard.  
25 For further information see “The Mighty Poles,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 13 May 2003, “Bulgarian Troops to go to Iraq in August,” BTA, 
BBC Monitoring, 14 June 2003, “Romania to send 678 Peacekeepers to 
Iraq,” Associated Press, 19 June 2003, “Slovakia to deploy 85 Military 
Engineers to Iraq,” Associated Press, 19 June 2003 
26 “The mission defines the coalition” is the post-Kosovo strategic 
dogma that advocated the decision is based not on the wishes of long 
standing alliance partners, but rather on the freedom of action that 
unilateralism allows. If countries are willing to participate in the 
mission, all well and good, but if the participation of requires a 
change in mission do to political constraints then go it alone. For 
further information see Donald Abenheim, “The Big Bang of NATO 
Enlargement,” Hoover Digest, 2003, Vol.1. Accessed on the web at 
http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/031/abenheim.html on 
10 December 2003 Also see Steven Everts, “A Word of Advice from Europe: 
Soft Power Works,” In the National Interest, accessed on the web at 
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1issue6Everts.html on 
10 December 2003 
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United States and the desire to join NATO, newly formed 
democratic countries agree to positions on issues of 
involvement and intervention that are contrary to the 
prevailing wisdom of the larger European powers (e.g. 
Germany and France) as is evidenced in the situation in 
post-conflict Iraq. 
   
A. A HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE 
The end of the Cold War caused many changes in the 
global security environment. The demise of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact coupled with rise of democracies and 
free market capitalism in former socialist/communist 
countries and newly independent Baltic and other former 
Soviet Republics beckoned for a new strategy and new 
organizations for engaging and supporting these fledgling 
democracies in Europe.  
In 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to 
foster discussions between the newly independent states and 
former Warsaw Pact countries and NATO members in order to 
promote peace and stability in the region.27 The promotion 
of peace and stability resulted in the creation of three 
programs: NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), U.S. European 
Command’s Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and the State 
Partnership Program (SPP).  
NATO’s PfP began in January 1994 Brussels Summit 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council. PfP’s aim was to 
enhance the stability and security across Europe. An 
invitation to join the PfP was extended to all nations 
                     27 Michael D. Dubie, “The National Guard: Promoting United States 
National Security” National Guard. Washington: September 1998. Vol. 52, 
pp. 80-81 
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participating in the NACC and other states participating in 
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE).28  
The aims of the PfP are transparency in national 
defense planning and budgeting process; ensuring democratic 
control of the military; maintaining the capability and 
readiness to contribute to operations under the authority 
of the United Nations and/or OSCE; developing cooperative 
military relations with NATO for the purposes of joint 
planning, training and exercises to strengthen the ability 
of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of 
peacekeeping, search and humanitarian operations, and 
others as may subsequently agreed; developing forces that 
are better able to operate with those of the members of the 
Alliance; and active participation in PfP will play an 
important role in the evolutionary process of NATO (NATO 
membership).29     
The JCTP is EUCOM’s peacetime engagement tool designed 
to bring American ideas and democratic values to Central 
Europe and newly independent states of the former Soviet 
Union. By using jointly staffed Military Liaison Teams 
(MLTs) of 3 to 5 member in country, EUCOM is able to 
provide expertise on a variety of issues. Using mil-to-mil 
contact events, the MLTs are able to help host nations in 
areas such as human rights guarantees to soldiers, civilian 
control of the military, establishment of military legal 
codes, and programs to develop professional non-
commissioned officers and chaplaincies.30 
                     28 “Partnership for Peace” accessed on the web at 
http://www.rta.nato.int/pfp.htm on 10 December 2003 
29 Partnership for Peace accessed on the web at 
http://www.nato.cz/english /partneri.html on 10 December 2003 
30 “JCTP Background Paper” accessed on the web at 
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The National Guard Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) 
are active participants in the MLTs. They provide a conduit 
to the state and ODC to integrate resources in the mil-to-
mil, civ-to-mil and civ-to-civ contacts. This is 
coordinated through National Guard Bureau’s International 
Affairs Division, the Combatant Command, and the State 
Partnership Coordinator in their respective states. The key 
to success is generating a need from the host country, 
which is relayed through the Office of Defense Cooperation 
and the ambassador to the BAO, who coordinates with the 
State Partnership Coordinator. The State Partnership 
Coordinator coordinates with NGB-IA in order to make the 
event happen.     
The history of SPP begins with the 1992 request of the 
Latvian government to develop a national military based on 
the National Guard’s model of the citizen soldier.31 
Lieutenant General John Conway, then Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau, took the historic opportunity with the 
blessing of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
engage Latvia in a bilateral military diplomatic 
relationship. Michigan agreed to partner with Latvia and 
the State Partnership Program was born. A short time later, 
the other Baltic republics were partnered-Estonia with 
Maryland and Lithuania with Pennsylvania. This dramatic 
start of SPP was two years ahead of the formation of PfP. 
As John Groves stated, “… the National Guard not only met 
the need for involvement in Central Europe, its success 
                     
http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/jctp-background.htm on 10 December 2003 
31 John R. Groves, Jr. “PfP and the State Partnership Program: 
Fostering Engagement and Progress,” p. 45 Parameters, Spring 1999 
accessed on the web at http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99spring/groves.htm on 9 December 2003 
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would contribute directly to the establishment of the 
Partnership for Peace…”32  
 
B. MILITARY DIPLOMACY AND THE PEACE IN EUROPE 
The effect of military diplomacy in conjunction with 
the political-economic impact of the European Union in 
maintaining and developing peace in Europe cannot be 
underestimated. With the exception of the debacle in the 
Balkans with the former Yugoslavia, previous ethnic and 
regional tensions in Southern and Central Europe such as 
“Usti nad Labem (Czech vs. Germans), Gyoer (Hungarians vs. 
Slovaks), Gabcikovo-Nadmarosz (Hungarians vs. Slovaks), 
Timisora (Hungarians vs. Romanians) and Brasov (Hungarians 
vs. Romanians) did not erupt in irredentist conflict during 
the same time.33  
In the case of Poland, it was predicted that the new 
united Germany would seek retribution for the Oder-Neisse 
line of the original boundaries of the German state before 
World War II. As smarter minds prevailed, the Germans 
sought to integrate within itself and with the West, 
instead of the seeking territorial expansion and further 
hostilities of an earlier era.34  
In fact the fruits of the labor of strategic 
engagement of which the National Guard has had a 
significant impact through its Bilateral Affairs Officers 
(NG) who are part of the MLT (EUCOM) which supports the 
overall philosophy of the Partnership for Peace through 
                     32 ibid p.45 
33 Donald Abenheim, “The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement,” Hoover 
Digest, 2003, Vol.1. Accessed on the web at http://www-




joint exercises and training, participate in the reduction 
of conflict between states, further inoperability through 
mutual understanding in planning and organizing forces, and 
recognition of the contributions that make the difference 
in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Europe, the 
Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.35  
Currently, peace in Europe is based up common 
democratic values, belief in the market economy and the 
need to share of the burden of common defense in order to 
reduce the overall cost of defense while providing the best 
possible response and protection to both friends and 
allies. Strategic engagement provides the conduit in which 
the exchange of ideas, the free-flow of information is 
available to the host countries, and in turn the United 
States is able to continue its engagement with Europe. In 
this exchange, the mutual benefit to both engaged countries 
and organizations, resulting in the development of 
relationships that move beyond agreements in to a deeper 
conviction of the shared sense of value in one to another. 
While this shared understanding may lead to fall-outs over 
policy (e.g. Iraq), baseline understandings and commitments 
deepen on crucial policy issues such as joint defense, 
burden sharing, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism.36 
The significance of burden sharing resonates through 
the Strategic Engagement program. With the end-state of 
member status in NATO, Poland provides a good, well-rounded 
case that demonstrates burden sharing, NATO enlargement, 
                     35 See  “Partnership for Peace: Aims of Partnership for Peace,” 
accessed on the web at http://www.nato.cz/english/partneri.html on 10 
December 2003 
36 Ibid, Vernon Penner, “Partnership for Peace,” Strategic Forum. 
Number 97, (Dec 1996), accessed at 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_97/forum97.html on 10 December 2003   
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integration with the ARNG, the challenges to converting an 
authoritarian military structure and the development of 
democratic values in the post-Cold War environment.    
 
C. FRUITS OF SPP LABOR: POLAND OUR FRIEND AND ALLY  
In 1991 with the historic reunification of Germany, 
Poland regained prominence in her traditional Central 
European position as the invasion route between Germany and 
Russia. As unified Germany became an accepted member of 
NATO in 1991, In Russian insecurities over the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and resulting independent states has 
created a security vacuum in Central Europe. As was stated 
earlier, the Baltic Republics feared an invasion or at the 
least subversion from the new Russian Federation and sought 
bilateral relations with the United States in hopes of 
gaining security. At the same time, Poland had traditional 
reasons to fear the unification of Germany over the post-
World War II border on the Oder-Neisse line. In addition, 
former Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Poland until 
1993.  
This unique power vacuum in Central Europe led to 
three unique positive organizational outcomes: 1.) Poland 
enters NATO in 1998 after involvement with the PfP and SPP, 
2.) Poland joins the European Union in 2004 after the 
initial invitation in 1998, and 3.) Poland participates 
fully with the United States in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.37 
                     37 For further information see, Wojciech Moskwa, “Poland’s Thunder 
Commandos join hunt for Saddam,” Reuters, 7 November 2003 in which the 
author describes in detail the storming of an offshore Iraqi oil 
platform in the opening days of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Also see “The 
Mighty Poles,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2003, Andrezej 
Olechowski, “Post-Iraq is Prime Time for Poland,” Wall Street Journal 
Europe, 15 May 2003, and Paul Ames, “NATO to help Polish Peacekeeper in 
Iraq; Unanimous decision eases Wartime Rift,” Associated Press, 21 May 
2003   
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Poland was the strategic key to balancing the new unified 
Germany within NATO and concerns over a return to Russian 
hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the case of Poland is unique in its entry in 
NATO, participation in Iraq and invitation to join the 
European Union, civ-to-mil and civ-to-civ contacts were 
important in meeting membership requirements for NATO and 
the European Union. Furthermore, mil-to-mil, civ-to-mil and 
civ-to-civ contacts offer a conduit to transfer ideas and 
information, which can create meaningful relationships 
between the United States and other countries. 
  
D. CIV-TO-MIL AND CIV-TO-CIV CONTACTS 
With the integration of a peaceful Europe and Poland 
participating fully as an ally and functional NATO member, 
what is the significance of the National Guard in military 
diplomacy? The answer lies with the foundation of the 
citizen soldier-citizen in the communities of this country.  
Alexis de Tocqueville once said,  
When an American asks for the cooperation of his 
fellow citizens, it is seldom refused; and I have 
often seen it afforded spontaneously, with great 
good will.  
 
It is in the nature of Americans to help worthy 
causes, which advance the national interest. The SPP has 
the unique ability through mil-to-civ and mil-to-mil 
contacts to develop and promote democracy through the 
actions of the civilians in the community.  
An example of the mil-to-civ contact is the case of 
the Illinois National Guard’s Counter-Drug Program 
presentations to civilians in Poland on youth program 
initiatives (Spring 2003). In February 2002 in Krakow, 
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Poland, Polish government leaders indicated that they were 
interested in exchanging ideas on the subject of “at-risk” 
youth. This resulted in civ-to-mil event in which members 
of the Illinois National Guard briefed Polish government 
civilians on youth programs and techniques the Illinois 
National Guard had implemented to work with youth.    
Another example of a civ-to-mil contact was Polish 
Officials from Malopolska District of Poland observing the 
Top Official (TOPOFF) 2 Exercise Scenario, which was a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenario conducted 
throughout Illinois on the week of May 12, 2003. TOPOFF 2 
was a joint (WMD) exercise in the U.S. and Canada. In the 
U.S., the exercise concentrated on WMD attacks on Chicago 
and Seattle. Without the established partnership between 
the Illinois National Guard and Poland, Poland probably 
would not have been able to see the integration of federal 
and state agencies acting in unison to react to WMD 
consequences.   
An example of the civ-to-civ contact is the success 
story of Mr. Chuck Hanson from La Crosse, Wisconsin. Mr. 
Hanson developed the relationship between La Crosse and 
Dubna, Russia.38 Using the Sister Cities model, he founded 
the La Crosse-Dubna Friendship Society in 1990. In the 
winter of 1991-92, Mr. Hanson organized a community effort 
of 5000 volunteers who collected 400,000 pounds of food, 
medicine and clothing called Hands-Across-the-Heartland.39 
                     38 For further information on the see “Making the Connection: 
Transnational Civilian-to-Civilian Partnerships” by CPT Albert Gorman, 
Masters Thesis, Naval Post Grduate School, December, 2002 
39 Attributed to the Biographical Sketch of Charles E. Hanson passed 
out at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference held June 2003 at 
the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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Mr. Hanson is also the founding President of the La 
Crosse-Luoyang Friendship Association that resulted in a 
sister- city type relationship with Luoyang, China.40  
Another example of the civ-to-civ contact is the North 
Carolina Dental Initiative. North Carolina is partnered 
with Moldova.41 In their state partnership program, 
volunteer civilian dentist and healthcare professional 
created a civ-to-civ contact with the Moldova Ministry of 
Health. By using education institutions and state 
government agencies, the North Carolina Dental Initiative 
has created a cooperative environment that fostered a 
lasting partnership. 
   
E. CONCLUSION 
Military diplomacy requires brining assets and ideas 
to the table in order to facilitate change and 
understanding. The United States will continue to use 
military diplomacy as tool of foreign policy to create 
lasting and meaningful relationships with potential allies 
and friends, and advance the interests of the United States 
of peaceful security, business and the promotion of 
democratic values.  
In this endeavor of military diplomacy, the citizen 
soldiers of the Army National Guard continue to offer the 
untapped resource of civilian skills and civilian 
organizations to foreign policy efforts. It is in the 
interest of the United States for the Army National Guard 
to continue to do so. Currently, the National Guard State 
                     40 ibid 
41 PowerPoint presentation “State of North Carolina-Republic of 
Moldova State Partnership Program,” Stephen Mackler, DDS, MS and LTC 
Steve Sloan, given at the 2003 State Partnership Planning Conference 
held June 2003 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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Partnership Program engages 42 countries linked to 38 
states and 2 territories.42 There is room for an expansion 
of the program with the right emphasis from the Combatant 
Commanders.  
The State Partnership Program offers the ability to 
engage countries using military-to-military contacts as a 
beginning, expanding into civilian-to-military contacts and 
creating with citizens of the states civilian-to-civilian 
contacts. SPP is unique in its ability to tap into the 
citizens of America to relate to their country’s foreign 
policy. In addition, the National Guard offers stability to 
the military diplomacy since the same military leaders 
remain involved in the program for years, which facilitates 
stable and lasting partnerships. 
The partnerships formed in the beginning of the 
program have provided assistance to the stability of 
Europe. Partner countries such as Poland work side by side 
with U.S. forces in Iraq and the Balkans. This effort of 
the U.S. and partner countries has been successful in 
helping enlarge NATO and provide worldwide stability.  
The next chapter examines the Army National Guard’s 
role in combat operations. It offers suggestions on the 
type of units the Army National Guard can field and how to 








                     42 NGB-IA PowerPoint presentation entitled, “The State Partnership 
Program: A Unique Security Cooperation Tool for the Combatant 
Commander,” Slide 8, accessed on the web at http://www.ngb-
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III. CONFLICT PHASE OPERATIONS 
It doesn't work to 
leap a twenty-foot chasm 




Since the birth of the Republic, the Army has had the 
time-honored responsibility, to fight and win the nation’s 
wars. In the beginning, the colonies raised militias to 
protect the settlements against attack from various tribes 
of American Indians and the French during the French and 
Indian War. The Army National Guard maintains this American 
tradition, but does much more, as well. 
Conflict phase operations43 are the traditional use of 
the army and the militia, this role was dominant long 
before support to civil authorities and domestic support 
operations became the Army National Guard’s most recognized 
role. The militia and, in cases outside state boundaries, 
volunteers were called upon to participate in fighting the 
nation’s wars. The militia and volunteers44 have 
participated in all of the nation’s wars including Vietnam. 
  
                     43 For the purposes of this thesis, conflict phase operations are the 
operations prior to and including combat operations. This includes the 
building of combat power in a theatre and the campaign. Post-conflict 
is defined as after the cessation of hostilities. While post-conflict 
and peacekeeping can include security operations, which resemble combat 
operations, post-conflict operations are not of the size, scope or 
magnitude of combat operations in terms of force-on-force conflict.  
44 Traditionally, the Army requests volunteers for a specific 
campaign or war. Cities or towns would raise regiments or companies 
depending on the size of town. Because of limitation in the “militia 
clauses” (Article 1, Section 8) of the U.S. Constitution, the militia 
did not participate in combat outside the country. However, the militia 
sometimes became volunteers to participate in the war overseas. For 
more information, see John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the 
National Guard, p.49, Macmillan, 1983  
30 
A. THE HISTORIC LEGACY OF THE MILITIA 
In the process of emigrating from Europe and in 
particular Britain, the American colonists brought with 
them a deep-seated fear of the standing armies. Much of 
this fear, which is represented in the political fights 
between the Federalists represented by Alexander Hamilton 
and the Democrats represented by Thomas Jefferson, arose 
from the perception that a standing military would trample 
these rights.45 
With a tradition of a militia and suspicion of 
standing armies, it was difficult for the founding fathers 
to decide what sort of military was needed to defend the 
new country. The founders decided the navy was to be the 
primary active duty force to be able to defend the shipping 
interests of the new country. The issue of the army was 
much more problematic. A leading historian on citizen 
soldiers, Jeffrey A. Jacobs states, 
 
The framers [of the U.S. Constitution] 
accepted the necessity of a national defense 
system but, heedful of the abuses they had 
suffered at the hands of the British army, many 
sought to avoid creating a professional standing 
army that potentially could become too powerful 
to control. Accordingly, they desired to create a 
regular force that was no larger than absolutely 
necessary and place a significant portion of the 
national defense burden on the militia46 
 
In deciding the new course for the nation, there were 
two groups of individuals. The Anti-Federalists were those 
                     45 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 
11, Macmillan, 1983, This anti-standing army fear came from the British 
experience of Oliver Cromwell and his standing army in England. 
46 Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 
and Answers, p.28, The University Press of Kentucky, 1994  
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that did not support a strong centralized government. This 
group supported the militia concept. The Federalists were 
in favor of a strong centralized government and favored a 
standing army to protect the young nation from foreign 
invasion.47 Also, at issue was the notion of protecting 
states’ rights, which are enshrined in the Tenth amendment 
as well as the right to bear arms in the Second amendment 
indirectly.  
A compromise was achieved in the constitution to 
balance—one pole of regular and the other pole militia. In 
Article one, Section eight of the Constitution of the 
United States of America reads,  
Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to 
pay the debts and provide for the common defense 
and general welfare of the United States; but 
all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States; …To raise and 
support armies, but no appropriation of money to 
that use shall be for a longer term than two 
years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make 
rules for the government and regulation of the 
land and naval forces; To provide for calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the militia, and for governing 
such part of them as may be employed in the 
service of the United States, reserving to the 
states respectively, the appointment of the 
officers, and the authority of training the 
militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by Congress.48 
 
                     47 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p. 
49, Macmillan, 1983, Richard H. Kohn, “The Constitution and National 
Security: The Intent of the Framers,” in Richard H. Kohn, ed., The 
United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 
1789-1989.(N.Y.: New York University Press, 1991)pp.61-65 
48 US Constitution Article I, Section 8 condensed to references on 
military forces. 
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It was soon evident by the War of 1812 that strict 
reliance on the militia clauses of the U.S. Constitution 
would not be enough to defend the nation in times of 
domestic unrest and national emergency. Congress called for 
the alert of 100,000 militiamen in response to an impending 
British invasion. The governor of Connecticut and 
Massachusetts refused to send the militia because they felt 
it was unconstitutional.49   
In 1820, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun advocated a 
cadre/conscript system. The cadre/conscript system was 
designed as an “expansible army” through a cadre of regular 
army officers and conscripts called in to fill out the 
ranks of the regular army when needed.50 In Calhoun’s 
opinion, regular forces rather than the militia should 
protect the frontier. The militia could not be raised in 
sufficient numbers in frontier areas; the terms of service 
for raising the militia were short;51 and the militia had 
not always responded to the call to colors due to the 
governors and state loyalties.52    
West Point continued to produce the future leaders of 
the Army, while the regular army of the U.S. remained 
                     49 Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 
and Answers, p.29, The University Press of Kentucky, 1994  
50 ibid p.32, Chapter 7, THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE, Extracted from 
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
OF MILITARYHISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, p. 155 Accessed on 1 December 
2003 at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-07.htm 
51 Chapter 7, THE THIRTY YEARS' PEACE, Extracted from AMERICAN 
MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF 
MILITARYHISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, p. 155 Accessed on 1 December 2003 
at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-07.htm, To further 
illustrate the problem with the short terms of the militia in the 
context of the First Seminole Indian War in 1817  “[General Andrew 
Jackson] calculating that the 3-month Georgia militia might have gone 
home before he could arrive at Fort Scott, he sent out a call for a 
thousand 6-month volunteers from West Tennessee.” ibid p. 153 
52 Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 
and Answers, p.29, The University Press of Kentucky, 1994  
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small. However, the United States was gaining more 
territory in fulfilling its “Manifest Destiny”.53 The 
American Civil War, which was a battle over states rights 
and slavery, brought the issue of the militia to the 
forefront.  
Both sides in the Civil War used militias from their 
respective states. Problems often arose out of ineffective 
leadership, which plagued the militias and inadequate 
training. The militias for their part resented being used 
as cannon fodder for the regular officers. The debate 
continued, but this time Emory Upton would impact Army 
Doctrine that continues to today. 
 
B. CONTENDING WITH EMORY UPTON 
There has been a tradition in the U.S. Army to 
distrust politicians. This tradition is reflected in the 
writings of Emery Upton, a tragic brevet American general 
officer from the American Civil War. It is Upton’s 
contention that much of the Civil War’s battlefield 
disasters on the Union side could have been prevented had 
the civilians been prevented from interfering in the 
business of the military. In essence, the professional army 
should be left to do what it does without the interference 
of the civilians, provided the civilians provide the 
resources to sustain the army.  
In his book of 1881, entitled Military Policy of the 
United States, Upton believes that the civilians should 
stay out military operations are and much more.    
                     53 “Manifest Destiny” was the popular belief and strategy that 
Americans had right to the territorial expansion in North America from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, from Canada to Mexico. In 
fact, the Mexican American War and the Indian Wars of the 1870s and 
1880s were an expression of the concept.    
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In seeking to trace all the great mistakes 
and blunders committed during the war, to defects 
of our military system, it is important to bear 
in mind the respective duties and 
responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The 
latter are responsible for the creation and 
organization of our resources, and as in the case 
of the President, may further be responsible for 
their management and mismanagement. Soldiers, 
while they should suggest and be consulted on all 
the details of organization under our system, can 
alone be held responsible for the control and 
direction of our armies in the field.54  
 
Eliot A. Cohen describes in his essay, “Making do with 
less, or coping with Upton’s Ghost”, the concept of the 
“Uptonian Hunker”. The Uptonian Hunker is the Army reading 
its history and cultivating professionals while expecting 
to be misused and abused by the civilian political masters-
stab in the back.55 
John C. Calhoun provided the “expansible army” which 
was central to Upton’s issues with the involvement of the 
militia and its politicians during the American Civil War.  
As a result of his suicide, Emory Upton might have been 
relegated to the trash bin of history if not for the 
Secretary of War Elihu Root. Elihu Root became the 
Secretary of War after the Spanish American War in 1899. He 
was a corporate lawyer from New York with experience with 
industrial trusts. He envisioned the Army as an industry. 
With the use of industrial management methods as his guide, 
                     54 Upton, Military Policy of the United States, p. 305, Washington 
Government Printing Office, 1917 
55 Eliot A. Cohen, “Making do with less, or coping with Upton’s 
Ghost,” p.7, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995  
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Elihu Root was determined to take the management of the 
Department of War into the new century.56 
In 1899 in order to transform the Army into a world-
class organization, Elihu Root arranged for the publication 
of Emory Upton’s the unfinished manuscript entitled 
Military Policy of the United States. Upton believed that 
John C. Calhoun was correct about the “expansible Regular 
Army.” This advocated a cadre/conscript system, which was 
at the heart of industrial practices of the time.57  
Elihu Root needed to transform the Army into a world-
class instrument of power-suitable for the age of 
imperialism. His accomplishments include formation of the 
General Staff and the reform of the militia in the Dick Act 
of 190358, which professionalized reserve service. In the 
official Army History,  
                     56 Chapter 16, TRANSITION AND CHANGE, 1902-1917, Extracted from 
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, p. 155 Accessed on 1 December 
2003 at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-16.htm. Some of the 
industrial practices were the ability to add and subtract manpower as 
needed to be able to reduce costs to having a large organization when 
it was not needed. This practice has led to a number of issues to 
include the individual replacement system, which is still being used 
today. The most important aspect of the individual replacement system 
is that it focuses on individual skills as opposed to unit skills. This 
important distinction leads to unit breakdown in units where unit 
cohesion has not been fostered. The Army National Guard bases its 
strength from the strength of the unit. It is not until the National 
Defense Act of 1933 that the mobilization of the Guard as units and as 
a reserve of the Army is enshrined in law.   
57 Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the 
National Guard, p. 348, The Telegraph Press, 1964  
58 The reform of the militia in changing the Dick Act (1903) was more 
from the preservation of manpower. Politically, Elihu Root understood 
that he could not eliminate the National Guard. However, he could 
reform it. This is not say that in the best of all worlds Root would 
have like to minimize the role of the National Guard to a purely 
militia role, not as a reserve of the Army. Instead, Elihu Root could 
use the National Guard to provide individuals (trained volunteers) for 
the regular Army. At the same time, BG John McAuley Palmer advocated a 
reserve of trained personnel under the concept of universal military 
training (UMT). The intent of UMT was the ability to fill out the Army, 
which was under strength with prior trained soldiers, which could be 
held on the reserve rolls.  
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 A lack of any long-range planning by the Army had 
been another obvious deficiency in the War with 
Spain, and Root proposed to overcome this by the 
creation of a new General Staff, a group of 
selected officers who would be free to devote 
full time to preparation of military plans. 
Planning in past national emergencies, he pointed 
out, nearly always had been inadequate because it 
had to be done hastily by officers already 
overburdened with other duties.59 
 
  
When resources of soldiers, material and money are 
scarce, the question is whether or not a cadre/conscript 
army is the right for the nation. Currently, the increasing 
reliance on the reserve forces of the United States has 
become a looming concern for U.S. Army commanders, who do 
not have confidence in the Army National Guard to conduct 
combat operations.60  
The fact that the Army National Guard has been allowed 
to conduct peacekeeping operations is largely due to the 
Army National Guard needing a mission in the wake of the 
death of the strategic reserve and the Army’s reluctance to 
conducting peacekeeping operations which it sees as 
detracting from the Army’s combat mission.61 
 The contempt for the peacekeeping operations, which 
are to the most part a light infantry operations or 
military police type operations, is understandable within 
the Uptonian Hunker. The civilian interference in the 
preparation for war by committing the Army to peacekeeping 
operations is but one way to contest civilian control. In 
fact, GEN Colin Powell, when he was the Chairman of the                      59 ibid p. 349 
60 John Y. Schrader, “Quadrennial Defense Review Analysis” p. 32 
61 MAJ Spencer W. Robinson, “The Role of the Army National Guard in 
the 21st Century: Peacekeeping vs. Homeland Security” December 2002 p. 5 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993, was against sending U.S. 
forces to Bosnia. General Powell states,  
 
American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved 
around on some sort of global game board. I 
patiently explained that we had used our armed 
forces more than two dozen times in the preceding 
three years for war, peacekeeping, disaster 
relief, and humanitarian assistance. But in every 
one of those cases we had had a clear goal and 
had matched our military commitment to the goal.62  
 
Institutionally, the Army needed to maintain its claim 
on combat power and the application of combat power. In the 
draw down of the early 1990’s, the Army moved from 18 
active divisions to 10 active divisions. Peacekeeping 
operations required less force structure to maintain and 
more civil affairs units, which were located in the Army 
Reserve. Unfortunately, the peacekeeping operations 
detracted from the readiness of the 10 active divisions by 
not allowing the Army to practice its combat mission with 
all of its 10 active divisions. In addition with forces 
permanently stationed in the Balkans, the Army has fewer 
forces to fight and win the two major theatre wars.  
By 1999, the Army could no longer hide the impact that 
peacekeeping was having on readiness due to frequency of 
peacekeeping operations losses combat training time and use 
of equipment.63 The brigades of the 10th Mountain Division 
and the 1st Armed Division dropped to the C-4 rating on the 
Status of Resources and Training Report (SORTS) as a result 
of their deployments in the Balkans. The Army needed to 
access the Army National Guard to be able to keep the                      62 Powell, Colin, My American Journey, p 576-578, Random House, 1995. 
63 “Pentagon: Balkan peacekeeping duties strain resources” November 
11, 1999 Accessed on 17 November 2003 at website 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/10/military.unprepared/ 
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active divisions at an acceptable level of readiness to 
fight in the two major regional contingencies. 
 
C. AN ADVOCATE FOR THE RESERVES: BG JOHN MCAULEY PALMER 
The antithesis of the cadre/conscript system advocated 
by Emory Upton was the small regular Army with the reserve 
forces, which was advocated by BG John McAuley Palmer in 
the National Defense Act of 1920. Palmer believed the idea 
of an “expansible army” was not conducive to the American 
political system.64 In essence, it would be politically 
untenable to establish a warrior class that would dominate 
the military and lead soldiers in a democracy.  
In 1919, the Chief of Staff of the Army proposed a 
500,000-man regular Army that would be expanded with 
conscripts. After World War I, the idea of a large standing 
army was politically unacceptable.65 Palmer arrived at the 
logical conclusion that the answer to rapidly building 
military manpower in a democracy was to have a reserve 
force of trained personnel to build a citizen army. Palmer 
was an advocate of universal military training, which was 
politically unacceptable in 1920. However, his ideas on the 
use of reserve forces allowed him to be chosen by Senator 
Wadsworth to work on the Senate proposal for amending the 
National Defense Act of 1916, which became the National 
Defense Act of 1920.66 
The National Defense Act of 1920 was the product of 
the post-war environment that did not support a large 
                     64 John McAuley Palmer, America at Arms: the experience of the United 
States with military organization, p.135, Yale University Press, 1941 
65 Richard B. Crossland and James B. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A 
History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908 -1983, p. 21, Office of 
the Chief, Army Reserve, Washington, DC, 1984  
66 ibid p. 34 
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standing army. The significant contribution of the National 
Defense Act of 1920 was to create the three components of 
the Army; the regular Army, the National Guard and the 
Organized Reserves.67 However, the National Defense Act of 
1920 did not provide for the mobilization of the National 
Guard as units.68  
The 1933 amendments to the National Defense Act of 
1920 provided the legal basis for the State National Guard 
entities to become the Army National Guard of the United 
States when federally mobilized. In essence, the 1933 
amendments recognized the dual nature of the Army National 
Guard as a state and federal entity, a kind of dual 
citizenship in the profession of arms. The legislation is 
both historic and profound. In recognizing the Army 
National Guard as a reserve of the Army, the Army created a 
situation by which the Army National Guard units could 
mobilize as units and deploy overseas in support of the 
foreign policy of the United States.69  
The application of the 1933 amendments resulted in the 
Army National Guard becoming part of the strategic 
reserve.70 With the ability to become a federal mobilization 
asset, the Army National Guard was able to maintain some 
                     67 ibid p. 34 
68 Jeffrey A. Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues 
and Answers, p.39, The University Press of Kentucky, 1994 
69 Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the 
National Guard, pp. 334-335, The Telegraph Press, Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, 1964. This recognition has further impacts on the 
relationship between those who want the Army National Guard to provide 
personnel for individual replacements and those that are unit oriented 
as the method of deployment. While the amendments of 1933 create the 
current system of reserves in the United States, the integration and 
inter-operability of the Army and its reserves has always been less 
than desirable. Further coordination and inter-operability have not 
been fostered until the need for integrating forces happens on the 
large scale as in the case of the Global War on Terror.   
70 Ibid pp. 334-335 
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degree of unit integrity in the mobilization for World War 
II and the Korean War. The effect of mobilizing the 
hometown unit to fight in the war had and still has a 
profound impact on the American people. In essence, the 
Army National Guard would need the support of the towns and 
cities in order to raise the troops in the first place. 
Second, the town would have a vested interest in the 
conflict because of their representation in the conflict.  
These efforts to integrate the American people into 
the conflict seem to have been lost around the Vietnam War 
(for reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, pp 7-8). The Army 
National Guard was relegated to the role of the strategic 
reserve. The strategic reserve was the force that could be 
used in the event of all out conventional war. However, 
nuclear weapons changed the necessity of a reliance on 
implementing the concept of the strategic reserve. It was 
to a certain degree reassuring to our European allies, but 
in the implementation was suspect.71  
 
D. THE STRATEGIC RESERVE IS DEAD 
With the situation of no longer having to hold the 
Communists in check, by nuclear and conventional means, 
there does not appear to be much value in heavy mechanized 
divisions in the Army National Guard. This is not to say 
that the Army National Guard does not have a role in the 
post-Cold War environment. Rather, these changes are coming 
and should be based on traditional strengths of the 
National Guard. 
Gone are the days of the strategic reserve, which can 
take up to six months to prepare for deployment from the 
                     71 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp. 
228-229, Macmillan, 1983 
41 
point of mobilization day. To create relevancy, the Army 
National Guard has to be able to deploy with the context of 
active forces. This requires several breaks in the existing 
mindset to accomplish this mission.72  
First, the plan to deploy forces overseas needs to 
include the Army National Guard at the beginning of 
overseas movement. To create seamless integration, the Army 
National Guard needs to move, arrive and fight at the same 
time as the Active Component units. This means greater 
coordination from both the Active Component and Army 
National Guard. Units of the both the Army and the Army 
National Guard need to be prepared to receive each other. 
It does not matter who owns the higher headquarters. It is 
incumbent upon both sides to create this integration.73  
Second, units need to have the equipment and personnel 
on hand to accomplish the mission. Gone are the days when 
the Army National Guard could say to unit commanders, “You 
will receive your equipment at the Mobilization Site.” 
Units need to have their equipment to train and ultimately 
deploy. Cross leveling of equipment, which is necessary to 
ensure that units have what they need, cannot be the 
standard. This will require hard decisions to insure that 
units are ready and able to use the equipment that is 
                     72 Changing the existing mindset is very much in the spirit in which 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld calls for new ways of thinking which is 
contained in the publication “Transformational Planning Guidance” April 
2003. p. 1 
73 Active Component /Reserve Component integration has been an 
unhappy union from its inception in GEN Abrams Total Force concept in 
the aftermath of Vietnam due to economic and civil-military relations. 
The inability to mobilize the Reserves and National Guard during the 
Vietnam conflict has had an Uptonian backlash culminating with Powell 
doctrine and some degree the Goldwater/Nichols Act (1986). This call to 
joint-ness is the impetuous for further integration of all forces into 
the seamless package. As listed in   “Transformational Planning 
Guidance” April 2003. p. 15 as Pillar 1 of the four pillars of 
transformation  
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needed. It would be a shame if a unit’s authorized Global 
Positioning System devices did not arrive until the unit 
was deploying. New equipment takes time to train and gain 
proficiency. Mobilization should not be the time when new 
equipment is sorted out. This is not an easy task. For it 
will require priority given to all units across the Army to 
be at the same equipment standard level. Soldiers do not 
deserve to be second rate on equipment if they are in a 
first rate fight.  
Third, equipment needs to be pre-positioned in the 
theater of operations to relieve the operational throughput 
at ports of debarkation in theatre.74 Real time operations 
require the equipment to be in place. In order to 
facilitate this change, the Army National Guard needs to 
have their equipment as well as the Active Component 
forward in theatre to reduce the lag of trans-shipping the 
equipment from the U.S.  
Fourth, personnel need to be ready to move in shorter 
amounts of time. It is not unreasonable to believe that 
units could change status from alerted status to mobilized 
status within two weeks. It requires having a mind set 
prepared to execute mobilization, a sense of urgency. The 
time at the mobilization site should be about two weeks if 
the equipment is on hand and the units are prepared to 
execute. 
                     74 This is much in the tradition of the Transformation literature of 
reducing the logistical footprint. I am not disputing legacy systems or 
hovercraft. What I am saying is that in order to reduce the lag time to 
put soldiers in theatre, exploitation of pre-positioning will be 
required with strategic commitment. This will reduce the logistical 
foot print in terms of transportation and handling of supplies for the 
first 30 days. See “Strategies for an Expeditionary Army” Research 
Brief, Rand Arroyo Center 2003 Accessed on 17 November 2003 at website 
http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB3042/ 
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Fifth, the mobilization plan and Regional Combatant 
Commander’s requirements need to be understood in advance. 
Some of the tasks of firing individual and crew-served 
weapons and certifying on individual tasks can and should 
be completed before entering the mobilization site.75 Unit 
commanders have a responsibility to integrate Regional 
Combatant Commander Requirements into the training plan. In 
the present day, the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) 
Commander has received the majority of units in the GWOT. 
Prior training will speed the process of mobilization.        
 
E. DETERMINING UNITS   
Individual skill sets are the key to developing force 
structure and unit cohesion that makes sense for deployment 
both domestically and abroad. It is in building up the 
individual, collective and leader tasks that the foundation 
of integrated training is based. Building up existing 
civilian skill sets is crucial to the development of 
rapidly deployable units that are able to conduct these 
tasks in the armed environment.  
Which roles can the Army National Guard successfully 
support?  The Army National Guard can support a wide range 
of missions from Special Forces to Truck Companies to name 
a few. The key is the reliance on the individual skill sets 
in support of the collective mission.  
                     75 The Commanding General of 1st Army, LTG Joseph R. Inge stated 
recently, “The focus of training for mobilizing units will be to 
achieve all established training requirements and to ensure that 
soldiers are properly prepared, both mentally and physically for 
combat.  If a unit can document that training tasks were conducted to 
standard prior to arrival at the mobilization station, there is no 
requirement to execute these tasks again.  We will capitalize on tasks 
conducted prior to arrival at the mobilization station by using our 
training resources to bring the unit to an even higher state of 
training readiness prior to deployment.” Attributed to Memorandum from 
the 1st Army Commanding General dated December 2, 2003 
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Who is a better D-7 bulldozer operator a soldier who 
has just received his training at Fort Leonard Wood or a 
citizen soldier who drives a bulldozer for a living? The 
soldier who drives the bulldozer for a living is more than 
likely the better operator. This country’s civilian skill 
set is untapped resource of the GWOT.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The role of the Army National Guard has changed with 
time from being the militia, through being the strategic 
reserve of the Cold War and presently with a very limited 
role in combat operations. The Army National Guard’s role 
as the strategic reserve of combat forces is no longer 
relevant based on the changes of ballistic effects on the 
battlefield. The combat phase of operations concludes 
before the strategic reserve can be used. 
The role of the Army National Guard has changed to 
units that provide combat support (military police, 
aviation and engineers) and combat service support 
(transportation, quartermaster, and medical). The 
integration of these units (with their civilian skill sets) 
into the conflict phase operations is paramount to 
successfully making the transition from combat to post-
conflict reconstruction. 
The next chapter examines issues with the post-








IV. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEKEEPING 
It is not worthy for a 
great State to fight for a 
cause which has nothing to do 
with its own interests. 
Otto von Bismarck, 1850 
 
  
 “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars”76 is the 
mission of U.S. Army. In the preparation and execution of 
this mission, all other considerations are subordinated to 
combat operations. With recent successes in Panama (1989), 
Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001-2002), and Iraq (2003) 
during the conflict phase of operations, the U.S. Army is 
plainly efficient at the art of war. However, the post-Cold 
War Era of the 1990’s and the early 21st century continue to 
change the strategic paradigm of the sole focus on combat 
in the narrowest sense.  
After the conclusion of the Gulf War (1991), there was 
an apparent absence of large-scale wars and a world that 
was involved in Somalia and Bosnia (intra-state conflicts). 
The U.S. Army had to adapt existing forces to meet the 
needs of an increasingly different policy of engaging in 
military operations other than war. The Total Force policy, 
which relies heavily on the use of Army National Guard and 
Army Reserve units to provide key elements to support the 
                     76 This has been the position of the U.S. Army since its inception. 
However, peacekeeping operations were not in accordance with this 
mission. During the Clinton administration, the shift to peacekeeping 
operations was in accordance with the national military strategy. In 
Defense Issues: Volume 10, Number 26-- Strategy of Flexible and 
Selective Engagement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state, “Being ready to 
fight and win the nation’s wars remains our foremost responsibility and 
the prime consideration governing all our military activities.” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/s19950308-report.html accessed 
on 23 Nov 2003 
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Army in worldwide commitments, integrates the Army National 
Guard into the world of post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacekeeping.77 The unique qualities of citizen soldiers 
contribute to these operations. Currently without the Army 
National Guard and the Army Reserve, the Army would not 
have been able to support the commitments due to the nature 
of the force mix between active and reserve units.78  
This chapter examines the contemporary issues facing 
use of the Army National Guard in post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacekeeping: 1) the frequency of use of 
Army National Guard soldiers in the Balkans, 2) the lack of 
national emergency associated with the deployment of Army 
National Guard forces in the Balkans and constitutional 
concerns facing the deployment of Army National Guard 
forces, and 3) financial considerations in use of the Army 
National Guard and reserve forces.  
 
A. THE COLD WAR IS OVER, NOW WHAT? 
The end of the Cold War (1989-1991) caused 
unprecedented debate in the foreign policy and defense 
strategy community, of the United States.79 The policy of 
containment, which was successful in its application of 
                     77 In regards to the Army, the Army’s version of the Total Force 
policy was designed originally as method by GEN Creighton Abrams to 
ensure that the Army was never able to go to war without mobilizing the 
Reserves. The intent was to find a way back to the American people 
through the population and to check the ability of the executive to 
engage the Army without gaining the consensus of the American people. 
For further information, see Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt p. 364  
78 “Review of Reserve Component contributions to National Defense” 
dated December 20, 2002  p. 9  
79 In regards to the foreign policy decisions and strategy, Paul 
Nitze stated, “There was less consensus today among Americans about the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy and security policy than there was at 
the end of World War II.” Paul H. Nitze, “Grand Strategy Then and Now: 
NSC 68 and Its Lessons for the Future,” Strategic Review, Winter 1994, 
P.17 
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mutual deterrence in the form of Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD) on the nuclear level, lost its appeal and 
practicality. U.S. conventional forces, which were devoted 
to the conventional response to the defense of Europe, were 
no longer needed in significant numbers to accomplish 
deterrence since there was no single threat. The cost 
savings of the reduction in forces was supposed to produce 
the “peace dividend”.80 
Without a specific threat (the Soviet Union), the 
strategic doctrine evolved from threat based response to 
capabilities-based military force.81 An example of this 
shift to a capabilities based force was change in combat 
orientation from the major conventional war in Europe to 
two major theatre wars (e.g. Iraq or Korea). With this 
shift, the question became the subject of the Base Force 
Concept (1989-1992) of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell.82 With 
the changing threat, GEN Powell felt that the forces could 
be reduced.   
The 1992 Base Force Concept (as it applied to the 
Army) was the reduction of the overall Army by 20-25%83 with 
a disproportionate amount coming from the Army Reserve and 
Army National Guard84. The Base Force Concept relied on the 
                     80 The “peace dividend” dates back before the Gulf War and the 
controversies in creating the right force mix between the reserve and 
active components. The Bush administration and the Congress realized 
that increased costs in defense spending would be cause further 
complications in balancing the federal budget. Congress started working 
on reducing defense spending with the Graham-Rudman Act as early as 
1986 in the height of the Reagan era defense build-up.  
81 Lorne Jaffe, “The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992” p.12 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/baseforc.pdf. 
accessed on December 2, 2003  
82 ibid p. 18 
83 ibid p. 12  
84 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors. P. 79 
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shift between the Cold War paradigm of the Red Army, which 
was the main emphasis by conventional and nuclear means to 
the concept of fighting two major regional wars.85 An idea 
that represented a certain continuation of U.S. strategic 
policy, the Army’s intent in downsizing the force was that 
less reliance on the reserves would create a more 
deployable force. Therefore, the Army could meet regional 
contingencies and still have integration within the scope 
of the total force concept in the event that wars might 
last longer than foreseen. 
Since “readiness is the key to relevancy”86, it is easy 
to see that with the 90 – 180 day post-mobilization 
training period for the Army National Guard Divisions that 
the war will be over before the Army National Guard 
Divisions reach the combat zone.87 They were not available 
                     85 Lorne Jaffe, “The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992” p. 2 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/baseforc.pdf. 
86 In viewing this concept: readiness is relevancy; a couple of 
concepts are needed to demonstrate the nature of the beast. Budgets are 
based on the amount of readiness or the ability to deploy in the event 
of war or national emergency. If you are not able to be ready to go to 
war, then what is your relevance to the power projection of the United 
States?  It is not impossible for the Army National Guard to go to war 
within 30 Days of being alerted. There are several factors that effect 
getting out the door. If a unit is an individual to small unit 
collective task type unit such as Military Police or Transportation, 
then it will be much easier getting the unit to the theatre. However, 
major maneuver organizations such as Armored and Mechanized Infantry 
Brigades and Divisions will take longer to certify at the higher levels 
of organization. It is important to also differentiate between conflict 
phase operations and peacekeeping operations. Army National Guard 
Brigades and Division would be able to deploy quicker than 90 days if 
the operation did not involve conflict phase operation and only 
security operations in which the Army National Guard is full vetted in 
support to civil authorities and domestic support operations.   
87 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, p. 36, The exact number of 
days required is dependent on such factors as: the equipment on hand, 
personnel status, supply status and the training status of the unit. In 
the case of a Heavy Enhanced Brigade of ARNG with an active component 
division headquarters, the post-mobilization training was estimated by 
the RAND Corporation at 92 days and ready to move in 102 days. With the 
mobilization of a Heavy Division three times the size of the brigade, 
it would fit in between 90 -180 day window.  Accessed at website: 
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR910/MR910.ch2.pdf on December 3, 2003 
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for the use of the active component in the event of rapid 
deployment to a regional conflict. With the added issue of 
180 day Presidential Involuntary call-up, the Army, which 
prides itself on its reliance on the reserve forces in 
terms of the Total Force policy, realizes that the very 
Army National Guard Divisions it needs would be demobilized 
before they reached the theatre.88 
In 1990-1991, there was great reluctance from both the 
National Guard and in Congress to reduce the combat 
divisions in the Guard.89 Each side had something to fear. 
The Congressmen feared losing jobs and votes in their 
communities.90 The State Governors feared losing their 
reserve force for state emergencies.91 The Army feared that 
it would not have the capability to fight in two major wars 
if it had to rely heavily on the combat divisions of the 
Guard. The Army did not want to lose combat divisions 
without a corresponding cut in the reserve component. With 
the inability to arrive in theatre until 90-180 days, the 
use of Army National Guard Division might affect the safety 
of U.S. Forces that deployed into theatre. In other words, 
the ability to reinforce a theatre with Army National Guard 
Divisions would adversely affect the potential outcome of 
combat operations.   
In the end, the Army National Guard avoided losing the 
bulk of its combat divisions because due to political 
aspects of reducing the Army National Guard were never full 
realized. The political associations of the Army National 
Guard fought hard with the Department of Defense to keep 
                     88 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, p. 36 
89 ibid p. 200  
90 ibid p. 201 
91 ibid p. 198 
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its strategic war fighting capability. The Army National 
Guard decreased from 10 divisions to 8 divisions currently. 
While, the active component decreased from 18 divisions to 
10 currently.  
 
B. WHAT TO DO WITH THE ARMY? 
In 1993 with the change in administration, President 
Clinton embarked on a foreign policy, which concentrated on 
the constabulary role of armies. In the 1993 Bottom-up 
Review (BUR), the Department of Defense identified four 
principal “new dangers” facing the United States: the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
regional dangers resulting from both large scale aggression 
and from ethnic, religious, and other forms of conflict; 
threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union 
and elsewhere; and economic instability resulting from the 
failure to build a strong and growing U.S. economy.92      
The BUR forged the blueprint of how U.S. forces were 
going to be reduced in the 1990’s, but also was the first 
tangible product of the new foreign policy of “engagement, 
prevention and partnership”. The traditional role of the 
military to fight and win the nation’s war was present, but 
increased missions in the form of peacekeeping, the 
continued containment of Iraq, humanitarian relief efforts 
and WMD issues of the Cold War continued to shape the Post- 
Cold War environment. Such a policy was controversial from 
the start when contested with Weinberger Doctrine 1982-83. 
                     92 See the Bottom-up Review, section I, An Era of New Dangers. 
Accessed at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part01.htm on 23 November 
2003 
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To the Army leadership, the return to nation building and 
peacekeeping was a nasty reminder of the war in Indo-
China.93   
United States Armed forces were called upon for many 
different missions during the 1990’s that did not include 
combat operations. The forces participated in humanitarian 
operations in Somalia (1992/1993), participation in United 
Nations operations in Bosnia (1994), leading the NATO force 
in Implementation Force (IFOR) (1995) and the subsequent 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) (1996) Bosnia in accordance with 
the Dayton Agreement, and fronted operations in Macedonia 
(1999) and stabilization operations in Kosovo (1999). The 
Army was committed to its new role peacekeeping whether it 
liked it or not.  
Through the late 1990’s, decreasing defense budget and 
reduced force structure required more out of every defense 
dollar. The Total Force policy created a nightmare for both 
the active and reserve components. The active units were 
losing readiness by not being able to train on the mission 
of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The reserve 
component was losing dollars for upgrading equipment and 
training. The result was a loss of interoperability between 
the active and reserve forces.94  
 
C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS (2000-
2003)  
With the Total Force policy, the Army uses all of its 
forces when executing an operation. The peacekeeping 
                     93 For further information see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. The Army 
and Vietnam, John Hopkins Press, 1986, p. 269 
94 Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua, “57Transforming the Reserve 
Components ©” Military Review, September/October 2000 accessed at 
website: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/SepOct00/fautua.asp on 
3 December 2003 
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operations in the Balkans required a number of assets that 
were located in the reserve component such as military 
police, transportation, civil affairs and public affairs. 
Units such as the 933rd Military Police Company from 
Chicago, IL supported peacekeeping operations by 
backfilling units that were stationed in Europe in 1996.95 
From February 2, 1996 through August 4, 1996, 152d Military 
Police Detachment of the West Virginia Army National Guard 
was deployed to Bosnia.96  The Army National Guard was 
activated in support of peacekeeping operations.  
The culminating point of the use of the Army National 
Guard and reserves in peacekeeping operations was the 
assumption of command of the U.S. SFOR Bosnia contingent by 
the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th Armored Division on 
March 7, 2000. For the first time since World War II, an 
Army National Guard General had command over active duty 
troops.97 From March 2000 through October 2002, the Army 
rotated the command of SFOR Bosnia between the Active 
Component Divisions and the Army National Guard Division. 
Beginning in October 2002 through 2005, the Army planned to 
have the Army National Guard Divisions command the U.S. 
SFOR contingent in Bosnia.  
The Army National Guard also contributes ground forces 
to the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR). Due to the 
pressures of using many active component divisions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the Army National Guard has taken the lead                      95 Interview with 1SG Joseph Vidinich, IL ARNG, former Active-Guard-
Reserve (AGR) soldier assigned to the 33D Military Police Battalion 
(Higher Headquarters of the 933D Military Police Company) on 18 
November 2003 
96accessed at website: 
http://www.usma.edu/dmi/MT/Branches/MP/mph2f.html, on December 3, 2003 
97 Nina M. Serafino “Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military 
Involvement”. Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
Updated March 14, 2003, p CRS-14 
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in the U.S. mission in Kosovo as well as Bosnia. This 
unprecedented use of Army National Guard Divisions begs the 
question of why? 
 
D. FREQUENCY OF USE OF THE ARNG 
With the Army National Guard units being used 
frequently in peacekeeping, can the Army National Guard 
further support units rotating to the Balkans? The answer 
is still out. The Army National Guard in the short term can 
continue to support the peacekeeping operations in the 
Balkans. Unfortunately, the number of Army National Guard 
units that will be called to support Afghanistan and Iraq 
will worsen the long-term commitment of forces in Balkans. 
The question will become more problematic in the years to 
come and depending on how the U.S. is able to diversify the 
burden of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans with European 
allies and non-aligned countries. Which as of December 2003 
seems unpromising, ergo, a greater burden will fall on the 
ARNG.  
There have been significant questions raised over the 
frequency of deployments. The Army National Guard has to 
contend with retention issues by using the same units again 
and again. Since the Department of Defense is using a 
rotational policy for the Army National Guard divisions in 
the Balkans, the effects of overuse may be mitigated. 
However, if units that rotated to the Balkans face 
additional rotations to the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan 
at a more frequent rate due to efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, then Army National Guard divisions face the 
same the effects of overuse on retention and readiness.   
However, such military police units as the 933d 
Military Police Company call this frequency of use into 
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question. This unit has not missed a call up for the state 
of Illinois or federal mobilization in the last 13 years. 
In 1990, they were deployed to Europe in support of Desert 
Storm. In 1993, they were called up to State active duty 
for the Chicago Bulls Riots. In 1993, they were called to 
state active duty for the Great Mississippi River Flood. In 
1996, they were called to active duty to support Bosnia by 
backfilling Europe. In September 2001, they were called up 
for airport duty in the Operation NOBLE EAGLE. In 2003, 
they were called up in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.98 
Units will surely answer the call and soldiers will 
perform their duty. It is the way of the soldier. However, 
frequency will become a greater issue in the long term. The 
employers and the families, who have been understanding and 
patient thus far, may not have the same patience in the 
future.99 This will most definitely affect retention of 
qualified soldiers in the Army National Guard as well as 
the readiness to deploy again.  
 
E. LACK OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS  
In exploring the larger issues of using the Army 
National Guard in the context of military operations 
overseas, one should examine the historical context of the 
Army in relation to the militia. The officers of the 
regular Army since the time of the Civil War have 
distrusted and disliked the militia (legacy of Emery 
Upton). Often the militia, which has had a history of being 
undisciplined and not prepared to go to war, has been                      98 Interview with 1SG Joseph Vidinich, IL ARNG, former Active-Guard-
Reserve (AGR) soldier assigned to the 33D Military Police Battalion 
(Higher Headquarters of the 933D Military Police Company) on 18 
November 2003 
99 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, p. 129, Review of Reserve 
Component Contributions to National Defense, December 20, 2002, p. 13 
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wrought with poor weaponry and lack of professional 
military education.100 The lack of resources has caused the 
militia to be unprepared for conflicts such as in the 
Korean War and some would argue presently. Unfortunately 
for those that hold this Uptonian view of the Militia, the 
use of the militia has been a requirement for every major 
war that the United States has participated. Even though 
the Army National Guard participation in the Vietnam 
conflict was limited the requirement was still desired by 
Generals Harold K. Johnson and General Creighton Abrams.101  
The nature of the reserve component/active component 
force mix is the ability to leverage low use assets such as 
Military Police, Civil Affairs and logistics which are in 
the reserve component, to the war fight at the time and 
place needed.102 In post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacekeeping, the same low density/low-use assets are 
needed to ensure that the Army has the units and 
capabilities to conduct operations.103 The current Bush 
                     100 This criticism of the militia dates back to the American 
Revolution. GEN George Washington was critical of certain militia units 
that would disappear when a campaign was in progress.  
101 Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt p. 185 
102 For further information on this point see Edward D. Simms, Chris 
C. Demchak and Joseph R. Wilk “Reserve Component Logistics Units in the 
Total Force” The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Bennie 
J. Wilson III, p. 160. The authors state, “The peacetime operating 
tempo of many combat elements generates relatively low demands on the 
military logistics system, especially contrasted with those expected in 
war. These low demands allowed many logistics units to be transferred 
to the Reserve forces with no apparent effect on combat readiness.” 
While Military Police and Civil Affairs are not in the same 
classification of logistics, they do fall under the category of low 
demand units for conflict phase operations. In the aspect of post-
conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping and military operations other 
than war these units are indispensable.  
103 Peacekeeping and post-conflict requirements lead to the use of 
low density/high demand units with increased frequency. These units are 
not needed in peacetime and have limited use in combat or conflict 
phase operations, but are needed increasingly for post-
conflict/peacekeeping operations. Examples of units include civil 
affairs, military police and engineers. “Transformation for Stability 
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administration has realized that the greater reliance on 
reserve forces comes with a price to the communities in the 
nation as well as the time required to mobilize and deploy 
the needed assets. 
To further illustrate this point, in testimony in 
front of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated,  
… Let me say that it is critically 
important that the department manage the forces 
in a way that we can continue to attract and 
retain the people we need; that the Guard and 
Reserve, who have just done a superb job, are 
not stressed, or called up so frequently or kept 
there so long that it affects their commitment 
to serve in the Reserves. We need them badly, 
and we have to be attentive to that, and we 
intend to be.104  
 
The problem is ostensibly of the career-oriented 
nature of the All Volunteer Force105. In order to attract 
and retain service members on active duty, the Army needed 
to provide career tracks that allowed soldiers to gain 
responsibility and rank. In essence, for a soldier to gain 
a retirement, the Army needed to ensure that an enlisted 
soldier, warrant officers and commissioned officer would 
have opportunities for promotion in the span of a twenty-
                     
and Reconstruction Operations” edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart 
Johnson, Center for technology and National Security Policy, National 
Defense University, November 12, 2003, Working Paper, P. 71 
104Testimony as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 9, 
2003. Accessed on 1 DEC 2003 at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030709-secdef0364.html 
105 During the beginning of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), the Army 
had significant problems attracting soldiers, which Eliot Cohen 
categorized as low quality of recruits, which plagued the Army in the 
first 10 years of the AVF. However, overtime the quality of the AVF has 
increased significantly in terms of only allowing High School graduates 
and a small percentage with their Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED). 
For further information see Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, pp. 170 
-182   
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year career. With the up or out policies of the active 
component106, there was an increasing shift to low density 
units such as transportation and supply to be sent to the 
reserve component so that the high density units such as 
the combat arms could be retained in order to have career 
progression for active component soldiers.  
In addition, it is easier and less expensive to 
privatize or contract out certain logistics functions such 
as depot level maintenance, transportation of equipment 
(much of this is shipped commercially by rail)107 and other 
supply functions rather than keeping and overhead of 
personnel and infrastructure that does not support the 
deployment structure. This is not to say that all logistic 
functions will be privatized. Rather a certain percentage 
of functions, which are non-deployable in nature, such as 
the element of the garrison directorates can be turned over 
for privatization, which includes housing.108 
                     106 The up or out policy dates back 1947, the Army had prior to World 
War II a policy in which strict seniority was observed. After the war 
both GEN Eisenhower and GEN Marshall advocated an up-or-out completive 
officer personnel policy based on having to replace commanders who were 
too old and not able to manage the stress of combat. Attributed to Col 
Orin C. Patton, USAF January-February 1979, 
Vol. XXX, No. 2, Air University Review accessed on 30 NOV 2003 at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan-
feb/patton.html For further information see Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 80th Cong., 1st 
sess., on H. R. 3830, 16 July 1947, p. 10. 
107 It is important to note that the cheapest form of heavy 
transportation for large units in the Army is rail. It is indispensable 
for moving equipment in mass to the Seaports of Embarkation. The Gulf 
War led to the rail facilities to be upgraded at most of the power 
projection platforms in the United States. 
108 The Department of Defense has used the Residential Communities 
Initiatives (RCI) to privatize housing on Army installations such as 
the ORD Military Community in limited numbers. It is the way of the 
future for military housing. For further information, see 
http://www.rci.army.mil/ accessed on the web on 1 December 2003 
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 If the reserves of the Army are to be used in times 
of emergency and war109, then continued operations in 
peacekeeping need to be viewed from the point of a national 
emergency. National emergency can be defined as a threat 
that poses grave or serious danger to the United States or 
in the case of state active duty, the state. On going 
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo do not necessarily meet 
this test. Those operations, which are detrimental to the 
readiness of the active component110, are not a direct 
threat to the United States. The operations represent a 
commitment of the United States to deploy forward to 
support democratic institutions and are noble in their 
aims, but do not represent an emergency. They represent a 
continued operation, which is in the interest of the United 
States.  
If reserve forces are to be activated in an 
involuntary call up to support operations that are in the 
interest of the United States, then there needs to be an 
amendment to U.S. Constitution to reflect this change. 
However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the 
commitment of the United States in the context of the 
Global War on Terror, which is a national emergency.  
 
F. FINANCIAL CONCERNS 
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review validated active 
component concerns about losing force structure to be able 
to commit to two major theatre wars. The active component 
was able to keep their 10 divisions with a net loss of 
                     109 US Constitution Article I, Section 8 
110 “Pentagon: Balkan peacekeeping duties strain resources” November 
11, 1999 Accessed on 17 November 2003 at website 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/10/military.unprepared/ 
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15,000 soldiers.111 The Army National Guard was to lose 
45,000 soldiers and there were no roles for the eight 
combat divisions in two-major theatre war strategy. 
The result of QDR 97 was the Army National Guard 
embracing the peacekeeping mission to retain the eight 
divisions. There were several factors in this decision. 
First, the Army National Guard divisions could reduce 
stress on the active component in developed peacekeeping 
operations. Second, the divisions needed a mission besides 
supporting state emergencies. Third, the use of Army 
National Guard divisions was cost effective112 because 
increasing the number of active duty divisions to meet the 
needs of peacekeeping operations was politically 
unacceptable.   
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping require 
a different mentality than combat operations. The 
increasing need for civilian skill sets is necessary to 
create successful results in peacekeeping and post-conflict 
operations. Combat operations do not allow the time and 
resources to be spent on embracing the population, which is 
the key to nation building.  
Try to have combat forces engage in peacekeeping 
operations degrades the readiness of the combat force and 
creates an awkward situation in trying to transition from 
the conflict phase to the post-conflict phase. These pains 
are readily apparent in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiers 
are prepared to execute one mission at time. The period of 
                     111 Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, Section V 
112 “Review of Reserve Component contributions to National Defense” 
dated December 20, 2002 p. 20 
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training for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans was 
three months during the initial active duty rotations. This 
transition after combat has been more difficult.  
Post-conflict and peacekeeping operations require 
forces that require more transportation, medical, engineer 
military police, civil affairs, public affairs and 
psychological operations units. Reserve forces have 69% of 
the combat service support forces and 63% of the combat 
support forces.113 In order to meet worldwide commitments 
these forces will come from the reserve component.  
The Army National Guard is vested in peacekeeping and 
post-conflict operations with involvement in the Balkans 
and Iraq. Changing the heavy divisions to military police 
and engineer assets will further vest the Army National 
Guard in these operations. These same forces, which help in 
combat operations by securing logistical assets, are the 
same assets that respond to homeland security missions.  
In deploying Army National Guard forces in post-
conflict and peacekeeping operations, a national emergency 
is critical to fulfilling the constitutional mandate. The 
requirements for forces should not be taken lightly in view 
of this mandate. The effects of deploying forces are 
significant on families in terms of reduced income and 
employers. The call to colors requires the mandate be 
enforced.    
 
 
                     113Attributed to Major Spencer W. Robinson’s Thesis at the Naval 
Postgraduate School December 2002 “The Role of the Army National Guard 
in the 21st Century: Peacekeeping vs. Homeland Security” p. 28 
 The figures are based off a slide in National Guard briefing 
presented to the Naval Postgraduate School by Major General Raymond F. 
Rees, Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 9 March 2000 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Wars may be fought 
with weapons, but they 
are won by men. 




The end of the Cold War has changed the global 
security environment. The outcome was the rise of 
internationalism in the political context and globalization 
in the economic context. In this age of internationalism 
with the rise of Partnership for Peace and United Nations 
involvement in peacekeeping (and eventually NATO e.g. 
IFOR/SFOR and Kosovo under UN authorization), the United 
States recognized terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
as critical threats to the defense of the country.114 The 
threats of terrorism were realized on September 11, 2001. 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Army 
National Guard supported civil authorities in the nation’s 
airports and on the borders. The Air National Guard flew 
security patrols over the nation’s cities and fought in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Guard is committed to 
the defense of the United States at home and abroad. 
Prior to and after September 11, 2001, the Army 
National Guard has participated in military diplomacy with 
the State Partnership Program and Partnership for Peace 
exercises such as PEACESHIELD, combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and post-conflict/peacekeeping 
operations in the Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Furthermore, the Army National Guard established and 
                     114 1993 Bottom-up Review, Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, 
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 
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trained the 27 Civil Support Teams in 26 States to support 
civil authorities in the event of a WMD incident.115 
  
A. BALLISTIC EFFECTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
Transformation of the services has placed emphasis on 
the efficiency of forces using precision-guided munitions 
and unmanned aerial platforms to exploit existing 
technologies. This emphasis on ballistic effects on the 
battlefield has created faster and deadlier maneuver forces 
that have used fewer personnel to decisively defeat the 
enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The use of effects based 
warfare in Iraq was supposed to facilitate a shorter 
reconstruction period in Iraq. Unfortunately, the successes 
of not damaging infrastructure have not translated into a 
quicker peace. 
Regime change has consequences that go beyond the 
strategic outcome of the battle. While ballistic effects on 
the battlefield result in quicker wars, fighting the peace 
continues to be a more problematic issue. Currently, combat 
forces are able to decisively engage and destroy enemy 
forces. The problem lies with the transition to post-
conflict reconstruction, which is neither efficient nor 
quick. The situation requires the civilian skill set that 
is available in the Army National Guard. The mindset of the 
citizen-soldier is supporting civil authorities. During 
countless natural disasters and civil disturbances, the 
Army National Guard has demonstrated time and again this 
support. 
The requirements for post-conflict reconstruction 
demand that armed forces are responsive to the needs of the 
                     115  This information is as of October 2001, accessed on the web at 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/120city.htm on December 16, 2003. 
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civilian population. With the example of Operation Blazing 
Trails, the Army National Guard demonstrates the ability to 
engage in civil action projects to support the population 
of a foreign country. Building schools, builds peaceful co-
existence. Embracing the population, which is central to 
fighting an insurgency such as Iraq, is a mainstay of the 
Army National Guard.  
Active forces continue to dominate the battlefield. 
Converting soldiers from the mission of combat to the 
mission of post-conflict reconstruction takes time. This 
gap of stability and reconstruction operations can be 
filled and executed by the Army National Guard.116  
The Army National Guard is fighting the peace in 
Afghanistan and Iraq with more units rotating in support of 
Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The Army 
National Guard has taken responsibility for Bosnia (SFOR) 
and Kosovo (KFOR) peacekeeping missions. The Army National 
Guard is in the thick of the forward defense and worldwide 
commitments of U.S. armed forces. 
 
B. SHAPING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD  
U.S. commitments are shaping the armed forces of the 
future. The Army National Guard will continue to change as 
well. There are several key factors that should influence 
the types of units the Army National Guard fields.  
First, civilian skill sets matter in developing units. 
For example, military police, medical, transportation, 
supply and engineer construction units are units comprised 
of civilian skill sets that are under arms. These units are 
                     116 “Transformation for Stability and Reconstruction Operations” 
edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, Center for technology and 
National Security Policy, National Defense University, November 12, 
2003, Working Paper, pp. 5-7 
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useful for strategic engagement, combat operations and 
post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, these same units 
provide critical support to civil authorities during 
natural disasters, civil disturbances and in the event of a 
WMD or terrorist incident. 
Second, the Army National Guard’s unique ability to 
reach and harness the power of American communities is a 
national asset. It provides the ability to use the best 
America has to offer and our national spirit of 
volunteerism. It is an untapped resource that when managed 
correctly demonstrates the best in civil-military 
relations-civilian control of the military. Furthermore, 
civilians become engaged with their military.         
Third, the citizen-soldier is committed to the defense 
of this country before, during and after a conflict. The 
soldiers of the Army National Guard demonstrate the 
professional soldier engaged in the forward defense of the 
United States by providing a role model to other 
militaries. Whether in peacekeeping in the Balkans, post-
conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, or a State 
Partnership Program event, the Army National Guard 
represents military subordination to civil authority and 
military support to civil authorities.   
 
C. CONCLUSION  
The Army National Guard is vested in the strategic 
engagement, combat operations and post-conflict 
reconstruction. The Army National Guard continues to evolve 
to meet the needs of a changing world. It is incumbent upon 
military and civilian leaders in the U.S. defense community 
to use the Army National Guard to support the forward 
defense of the United States. 
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